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A decade after the banking and financial crisis hit Europe, George Gerapetritis’s New 
Economic Constitutionalism in Europe provides a detailed and interdisciplinary interpreta-
tion of the consequences of those events from the constitutional standpoint in Eu-
rope. Main argument of the book is that the economic crisis has brought about a new 
era in European constitutionalism: “new economic constitutionalism”. In this histor-
ical phase, still shaping European’s reality today, economic provisions have gained 
priority both in the drafting and reading of constitutions – thus bringing a “significant 
change of paradigm in the economic governance of the respective States” (p.80). This 
upgrade of the economic provisions mirrors the establishment of “financialism as an 
economic constitutional identity” (pp.3, 201). 
The first chapter of the book clarifies the notion of new economic consti-
tutionalism. Gerapetritis argues that if we consider society as composed of “function-
ally differentiated subsystems” (p.11), economy – intended here as one of its subsys-
tems – gained prevalence since the end of World War II. This “upgrade” of economy 
reaches its peak with the financial crisis, as evidenced by the transferral of economic 




competences to the supranational level of governance and the priority given by con-
stitutions to economic provisions, as in the bail-out clauses of the Treaty of the func-
tioning of the European Union (Articles 125 and 123). On one side, therefore, the 
economy has begun to enjoy a normative capacity as the subsystems of law and pol-
itics.  On other, constitutions shifted from tolerating or abstaining from intrusion in 
the economy to the prioritization of these aspects. This dynamic lies at the heart of 
financialism. 
Gerapetritis carries out a great tracing exercise in elucidating how financial-
ism could come to be embraced by States and supranational entities in Europe – 
whose legal orders are also part of the analysis. Constitutional identity could in fact 
be assumed to be a notion pertaining to the realm of the State. However, the Euro-
pean Communities were exactly established on that ordoliberal economic identity. 
Thus, “national States exported constitutionalism and imported economic identity”, 
searching for functionality while “the supranational entities exported their economic 
identity and imported constitutionalism”, searching for legitimacy (p.29). 
Having established the concept of new economic constitutionalism, the au-
thor proceeds to assess the impact of this new paradigm on constitution-making 
(ch.2), on constitutional interpretation (ch.3), on governance (ch.4) and on politics 
(ch.5). 
In terms of constitution-making, few Member States’ constitutions included 
economic governance provisions in their text prior to the crisis. This has not under-
gone profound changes, as the post-crisis adaptation was attained “without wide con-
stitutions revisions or EU Treaties’ amendments” (p.318). Clear examples are the 
cases of France and Austria. The obligations deriving from the Fiscal Compact in the 
first case and from the Balanced Budget Rule in the second were transposed as ordi-
nary statutes since the requirements for constitutional laws were not satisfied. This 




absence of major constitutional revisions is mitigated by the recognition of the para-
dox between the extremely fast pace at which economy develops as a subsystem (“ag-
ile economy”) and its integration in the Constitution, which by reason of its rigid 
nature cannot embrace this fast adapting and futuristic character (p.22).  
The lack of amendments in primary law texts has granted though a note-
worthy role to the judiciary, called to verify the compatibility of the new legislation 
with the constitutional provisions (p.224). This is extensively examined in the third 
chapter. The sample of laws considered – divided by topic, country and origin (do-
mestic/European court level) – is outstanding in its size and comparative prospect. 
While the reader could have benefit from some more guidance on the rationale be-
hind the structuring of chapter 3, this contribution greatly enriches the existing liter-
ature, which has been focusing either on specific cases, singular countries or single 
levels of governance. The last section of the chapter examines the case of property. 
Particularly interesting is the discussion on how the national and EU courts have 
reduced their judicial review because of the presence of “complex technical judg-
ments or political choices” (p.185), leading to judicial self-restraint and highlighting 
the risks for authoritarian drift and for human rights’ protection. 
With respect to governance, Gerapetritis raises two interesting points in 
chapter 4. The first one deals with judicial responsiveness, as the Court of Justice is 
called out to be “from the very beginning, […] part of the problem” since it did not 
actively intervene when it had the chance to make Member States adhere to rules of 
financial discipline, as illustrated by the 2004 cases of Germany and France’s excessive 
deficit (p.227). The second point pertains to the doctrine of implied powers. While in 
the pre-crisis legislation this doctrine was very cautiously acknowledged by the Court, 
the author underlines how the Court of Justice has incurred in “serious technical 
contradictions” by employing conflicting interpretations of the principle of conferred 




powers in Pringle and Gauweiler, substantiating the competence of Member States in 
the former post-crisis case and the competence of the European Central Bank in the 
latter (p.250).  
The fifth chapter presents the effects of new economic constitutionalism on 
politics. These include the increase in euro-scepticism and dichotomies such as lenders 
vs debtors and financial stability vs social cohesion. Another illustration is the recourse to 
technocratic governments, leading to a depart from representative democracy. In the 
successive chapter Gerapetritis addresses these neglected consequences on legitimacy 
and rule of law. He criticizes indeed the mere use of tools of economic governance 
to solve the crisis, advancing an “EU Recalibration proposal” which focuses on de-
liberativeness, global solidarity and intergenerational sustainability, better understand-
ing of market’s functioning and – most crucially – strengthening of institutions’ resil-
ience. 
To conclude, Gerapetritis’ book provides not only a detailed analysis of the 
effects of the economic crisis on constitutionalism, but also informed and forward-
looking solutions for a better crisis-management capacity at the European level. The 
multidisciplinary nature of the book – touching upon law, economics and political 
science theories and practices – is among the main merits of Gerapetritis. He himself 
underlines the very limited number of constitutional revisions – weakening the claim 
of a paradigm shift – and the doubts on the willingness of Member States to accom-
plish the needed institutional restructuring. Nevertheless, this in-depth study remains 
an excellent starting point to understand how constitutionalism endured the eco-
nomic crisis, the development of constitutional interpretation and the accountability 
and risk management challenges we are still facing. 
Chiara Russo 
